Governance: who decides what
Turkish law splits corporate decision-making into two layers, whether the company is a JSC or an LLC: the general assembly of shareholders, which decides the matters reserved to owners (approving accounts, distributing dividends, amending the articles, appointing and dismissing directors, capital changes, mergers), and the board of directors / manager(s), who run the company's ordinary business and represent it toward third parties.
For a wholly-owned subsidiary this is often a formality — the sole shareholder simply passes its own resolutions — but the formalities still matter: minutes, share registers and resolution books must be kept properly, because their absence becomes a real problem the day the company is audited, sold, or sued.
Turkish practice distinguishes an ordinary general assembly, held at least once a year within three months of the fiscal year-end to approve accounts and discharge the board, from an extraordinary general assembly, called whenever a matter requiring shareholder approval arises outside that annual cycle (a capital increase, an amendment to the articles, or the removal of a director, for instance). Both must be convened on notice, with an agenda that is binding — a resolution on a matter not on the agenda can be challenged and annulled, a rule foreign shareholders sometimes trip over when they try to resolve an "obvious" additional matter informally at the same meeting.
Ordinary resolutions generally pass by simple majority of votes present; certain matters (capital decrease, change of field of activity, conversion, merger, de-merger) require heightened quorums and majorities set out in the articles or the Code — worth checking before assuming a routine vote will pass.
The board and management
A JSC is managed by a board of directors, which may be a single member, and which may include non-Turkish, non-resident individuals or (through a representative) legal entities. An LLC is managed by one or more managers, at least one of whom must be a shareholder unless the articles say otherwise. In both forms, the manager(s)/board represent the company vis-à-vis banks, tax authorities, employees and counterparties, and their signature authority (tek başına or joint signature) is registered and published — counterparties are entitled to rely on what the trade registry says.
Board resolutions for a JSC may in principle be adopted without a physical meeting where the articles allow it, but the safer and far more common practice — especially for a foreign-owned company whose sole director sits abroad — is to hold the meeting (in person or by conference call) and sign written minutes, since a properly minuted resolution is what a bank, a notary, or a counterparty will actually ask to see before honoring a transaction.
Foreign investors commonly appoint a trusted local manager or a regional executive under a carefully scoped power of attorney, while keeping ultimate control at shareholder level through the articles and a shareholders' agreement. The scope of that power of attorney deserves real drafting attention: an overly broad POA can let a local manager bind the company well beyond what the foreign shareholder intended, while an overly narrow one forces the shareholder to sign every routine document from abroad.
Share transfers and the articles
How freely shares can change hands depends heavily on entity type and on what the articles say:
- JSC — registered shares: transferable by endorsement and delivery (or electronic registry entry for dematerialized shares); the articles may restrict transfer (a "registered share transfer restriction") requiring board consent, which is the normal tool for keeping unwanted third parties out of a closely-held JSC.
- LLC: a share transfer requires a notarized transfer agreement and, unless the articles waive it, approval by the general assembly; the transfer only takes effect against the company and third parties once entered in the share ledger and (for LLCs) registered with the Trade Registry.
Because the default rules are permissive, investors bringing in a second shareholder — a local partner, an employee incentive scheme, or a co-investor — should have the articles and any shareholders' agreement drafted (or amended) before that happens, not after, to lock in pre-emption rights, tag-along/drag-along mechanics, and any veto rights the foreign parent wants to keep. A shareholders' agreement is a contract between the shareholders, not the company, and is enforced under ordinary contract law principles — which means, in particular, that a breach of the agreement does not automatically make a share transfer registered in violation of it void as against the company, unless the restriction is also reflected in the articles themselves. Foreign investors used to jurisdictions where a shareholders' agreement alone is treated as fully dispositive should build the key restrictions into the articles, not leave them only in a side agreement.
Minority shareholder protections
The Code gives minority shareholders a real set of tools even where a shareholders' agreement is silent: the right to request information at the general assembly, to challenge resolutions taken in violation of law or the articles, to demand a special audit in narrow circumstances, and — for JSCs meeting certain thresholds — the right to request the calling of a general assembly or the addition of an agenda item. A foreign majority investor bringing in a local minority partner should assume these statutory rights apply on top of, not instead of, whatever the shareholders' agreement says.
A resolution can be annulled by court action within three months of the general assembly if it was taken in violation of law, the articles, or the principle of good faith — a right minority shareholders in Turkey use more actively than foreign parents sometimes expect, particularly around dividend policy and related-party approvals.
Related-party transactions
Transactions between a Turkish subsidiary and its foreign parent or affiliates — management fees, royalty charges, intercompany loans, cost-sharing arrangements — are common and lawful, but sit under two separate layers of scrutiny: corporate law duties of loyalty and care owed by directors dealing with a related party, and tax law transfer-pricing rules requiring such transactions to be priced at arm's length (see the tax guide). Groups that document the commercial rationale and pricing of intercompany arrangements from the outset avoid most of the friction that arises later, whether from a tax audit or a minority shareholder's challenge.
For a JSC, the Code also restricts a company from extending loans or guarantees to its own directors or their relatives, and imposes notification and, in some cases, board-approval requirements before a director enters into a transaction that competes with the company or involves a personal interest — rules that catch out foreign appointees who are also active in group companies elsewhere in the structure.
Keep a related-party transaction file — the agreement, the pricing rationale, and board approval — for every intercompany service, license, or loan arrangement. It is the single cheapest piece of housekeeping that protects both directors and the company later.
Piercing the corporate veil
The starting principle of Turkish company law is strict separation: a shareholder's personal assets are not liable for the company's debts, and a company is not liable for its shareholder's personal debts, beyond the shareholder's committed capital contribution. Turkish courts nonetheless recognize a narrow doctrine — tüzel kişilik perdesinin kaldırılması / aralanması (piercing or lifting the corporate veil) — allowing a creditor to reach a shareholder's, or an affiliated company's, own assets where the separate legal personality has been used abusively: where the shareholder's and the company's assets have become genuinely intermingled, where the corporate form is used in bad faith specifically to escape an existing liability, or where a bare shell with no real activity or capital of its own operates purely as a front for its shareholder or an affiliate (the "organik bağ," or organic link, doctrine used to reach sister companies under common control).
This is a real, if narrowly applied, risk foreign groups should keep in mind whenever a Turkish subsidiary is thinly capitalized, has minimal independent operations, or is used mainly as a pass-through for a parent's Turkish activities — a structure that on its own is not unlawful, but becomes more exposed if the company later becomes unable to pay a creditor.
Directors' and managers' liability
Board members and managers owe the company a duty of care and loyalty, and can be held personally liable for damage caused by breach of their legal or statutory duties — including, notably, for a portion of unpaid public debts (tax and social security premiums) of the company in specific circumstances set out in tax and social security legislation, not just under the Commercial Code. This is one area where foreign appointees sometimes underestimate their personal exposure: signing as a company director in Turkey is not a purely ceremonial role, and resigning from a directorship on paper does not retroactively erase liability for decisions taken while in office.
Directors' and officers' (D&O) liability insurance, clear delegation of authority, and properly minuted board decisions are the standard risk-management tools, and are worth putting in place from day one rather than after a dispute arises. A discharge (ibra) resolution passed by the general assembly for a given fiscal year releases directors from liability for matters disclosed at that assembly, but does not protect against claims later found to rest on facts that were concealed or not properly disclosed at the time.
M&A and restructuring basics
Buying an existing Turkish company (rather than incorporating a new one) typically proceeds by a share purchase agreement governed by Turkish or foreign law (subject to certain mandatory local rules), preceded by legal, tax and financial due diligence, and followed by registration of the new shareholder(s) with the Trade Registry. Larger transactions may trigger a filing with the Turkish Competition Authority under merger control thresholds set by the Competition Board, which foreign acquirers should check early — closing before clearance where a filing is mandatory carries real penalty risk, and can in principle expose the transaction itself to challenge.
Mergers, de-mergers and share-for-share conversions between Turkish entities are also available under the Code's dedicated restructuring provisions, and can offer tax-neutral treatment when structured to meet the Corporate Tax Law's conditions for a qualifying merger or de-merger. Due diligence on the target's related-party transaction history and any pending or threatened minority shareholder claims is worth particular attention, since both are areas where a foreign acquirer inherits exposure that a purely financial review will not surface.
How Turkish courts treat the corporate veil and directors' exposure
Two lines of Yargıtay authority define the outer edge of shareholder and affiliate liability in Turkey — useful to know before assuming limited liability is absolute, and equally useful to know how far it actually goes.
Piercing the veil through an "organic link" between affiliated companies
The court held that while shareholders of a capital company are, in principle, not liable for the company's debts, this separation can be disregarded where the shareholder identifies itself with the company, where the shareholder's and the company's assets are commingled, or where the corporate form is used in bad faith and calculatedly to escape liability toward creditors. On that basis, a company shown to be under common management, address and ownership with the debtor company (an "organic link") could also be held liable for the debtor's obligation.
Mere common ownership or single-shareholder status is not, by itself, enough
Turkish courts have been equally consistent on the flip side: being the sole shareholder or sole manager of a company, or belonging to the same group as another company, does not by itself justify piercing the veil. Something more is required — asset commingling, undercapitalization used as a device, or a demonstrable bad-faith use of the corporate form to defeat a specific creditor.
A board member cannot vote on the general assembly's resolution discharging that same member
The court confirmed that directors are barred from voting on the resolution discharging (ibra) their own management of the company for the relevant fiscal year, and held that a shareholder may seek annulment of a discharge resolution even without having formally recorded a dissent in the meeting minutes, where the conflict-of-interest voting rule was itself violated.
Case summaries above are Salik Avukatlik Burosu's own English paraphrase of the published holding, prepared for general orientation. They are not certified translations and should not be quoted as the court's original wording; always verify against the full Turkish-language decision (Esas/Karar numbers as cited) before relying on it in a filing.